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Norman Solomon
3 Oct 2009
Rediscovering the Real Columbus

Columbus Day is a national holiday. But it's also a good time to confront the mythology about the heroic … Read More.

26 Sep 2009
A Farewell Column, But Not Goodbye

Seventeen and a half years ago — at a time when a little-known governor named Bill Clinton was running … Read More.

12 Sep 2009
The Devastating Spin for War

For those who believe in making war, Kabul is a notable work product. After 30 years, the results are in: a … Read More.

Media Outlets Do Little To Disrupt War Folly

"The March of Folly," by historian Barbara Tuchman, was published 25 years ago. Yet the book does more to explain the Obama administration's approach to the Afghan War than almost anything we've heard from present-day news media.

What happens among policymakers is a "process of self-hypnosis," Tuchman writes. After recounting examples from the Trojan War to the British moves against rebellious American colonists, she devotes the closing chapters of "The March of Folly" to the long arc of the U.S. war in Vietnam.

The parallels with the current escalation of the war in Afghanistan are more than uncanny. They speak of deeply rooted patterns.

With clarity facing backward, President Obama can make many wise comments about international affairs while proceeding with actual policies largely unfettered by the wisdom. From the outset of U.S. involvement in Vietnam, Tuchman observes, vital lessons were "stated" but "not learned."

As with John Kennedy — another young president whose administration "came into office equipped with brain power" and "more pragmatism than ideology" — Obama's policy adrenalin is now surging to engorge something called counterinsurgency.

"Although the doctrine emphasized political measures, counterinsurgency in practice was military," Tuchman writes, an observation that applies all too well to the emerging Obama enthusiasm for counterinsurgency. And "counterinsurgency in operation did not live up to the high-minded zeal of the theory. All the talk was of 'winning the allegiance' of the people to their government, but a government for which allegiance had to be won by outsiders was not a good gamble."

Now, as during the escalation of the Vietnam War — despite all the front-page articles and news bulletins emphasizing line items for civic aid from Washington — the spending for U.S. warfare in Afghanistan is overwhelmingly military.

From the top of the current administration — as the U.S.

troop deployments in Afghanistan continue to rise along with the American air-strike rates — there is consistent media messaging about the need to "stay the course," even while bypassing such tainted phrases.

The dynamic that Tuchman describes as operative in the first years of the 1960s, while the Vietnam War gained momentum, is no less relevant today: "For the ruler it is easier, once he has entered a policy box, to stay inside. For the lesser official it is better, for the sake of his position, not to make waves, not to press evidence that the chief will find painful to accept. Psychologists call the process of screening out discordant information 'cognitive dissonance,' an academic disguise for 'Don't confuse me with the facts.'" Along the way, cognitive dissonance "causes alternatives to be 'deselected since even thinking about them entails conflicts.'"

During the mid-1960s, while American troops poured into Vietnam, "enormity of the stakes was the new self-hypnosis," Tuchman comments. She quotes the utterly conventional wisdom of New York Times military correspondent Hanson Baldwin, who wrote in 1966 that U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam would bring "political, psychological and military catastrophe."

Sound familiar?

For a president, with so much military power under his command, frustrations call for more of the same. The seductive allure of counterinsurgency is apt to heighten the appeal of "warnography" for the commander in chief; whatever the earlier resolve to maintain restraint, the ineffectiveness of more violence invites still more — in Afghanistan and Pakistan, as in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia.

"The American mentality counted on superior might," Tuchman commented, "but a tank cannot disperse wasps." In Vietnam, the independent journalist Michael Herr wrote, the U.S. military's violent capacities were awesome: "Our machine was devastating. And versatile. It could do everything but stop."

That is also true, routinely, of a war-making administration, which depends on high-profile journalists not to ask too many truly unpleasant questions.

Norman Solomon is the author of the book "War Made Easy: How Presidents and Pundits Keep Spinning Us to Death," which has been made into a documentary film. For information, go to: www.normansolomon.com.

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