Plane Crash the Result of a Broken System

One staggering revelation after another tumbled out during the National Transportation Safety Board's three-day hearing into the deadly crash of a commuter plane operated by Colgan Air near Buffalo, N.Y., in February.

What is more disturbing? That the pilot, Capt. Marvin Renslow, had failed five flight tests over five years? Or that Renslow had never had hands-on flight simulator training on the "stick-pusher" emergency system, the system he disastrously mishandled in the critical final moments of the flight?

Other disclosures are almost as dismaying:

In the minutes before the crash, Renslow, 47, and his first officer, Rebecca Shaw, 24, were chatting about nonessential matters in violation of Federal Aviation Administration rules against such conversation when an aircraft is below 10,000 feet. An FAA safety inspector assigned to Colgan Air, the operator of commuter planes for Continental and other airlines, reported to the safety board that he had seen Colgan pilots repeatedly violate that rule, even when he was onboard, indicating a culture where "you can kind of slide by, cut corners, wink and nod when the FAA is not there."

Both pilots might have been fatigued. On the cockpit voice recorder, they could be heard yawning. Renslow, a Florida resident, apparently slept in the crew lounge at Newark Liberty International Airport the night before the flight, a violation of company rules that can lead to dismissal.

Shaw flew overnight from her home near Seattle, switching planes in Memphis, to get to her assignment in Newark.

The Colgan pilots, like those at most commuter airlines, were not well paid. One reason they commuted to Newark from their distant homes was that they apparently could not afford to share "crash pads" with other airline employees in the New Jersey area. Shaw, who had been with Colgan for 13 months, earned $16,254 in her first year. She had a second job in a coffee shop for part of her first year as a pilot. Renslow made about $55,000 annually.

The pilots had limited experience in the Bombardier Dash 8 Q400 turboprop, the type of plane that crashed. Renslow had about 110 hours, Shaw fewer than 800 hours.

The revelations about the crash, which killed all 49 people onboard and one on the ground, must galvanize the NTSB, the FAA and Congress, if necessary, into taking action to reduce the chances of a similar accident occurring again.

Better background checks and disclosures must be required so that failed "check rides," the tests Renslow failed, are readily knowable to employers. Renslow failed to disclose two of his three pre-employment failures to Colgan. He failed two more of the tests while working for the carrier, but was eventually certified. Pilot training must be upgraded, including requiring hands-on stick-pusher training, not just classroom instruction. Cockpit discipline rules must be enforced at the risk of severe penalties for pilots and carriers if they are not. And airlines and regulators must do more to ensure that fatigued pilots do not take the controls and put lives at risk.

REPRINTED FROM THE SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE.

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