Eight Years Later

Soon after the Sept. 11 attacks eight years ago, this country invaded Afghanistan, embarking on the "good" war to dislodge those who had attacked and those who had given them safe haven.

It's 2009 and the war there is feeling less "good." This has nothing to do with the motivations going in but, rather, faulty and tardy strategies for staying in. As the country winds down its ill-advised Iraq misadventure, it's fair to ask whether the war in Afghanistan is worth a single more American life.

President Barack Obama inherited the war. But U.S. involvement in Afghanistan is his problem to fix now. Neither creeping nor massive military escalation is likely to accomplish that.

We have favored a previous minimal increase in U.S. troops in Afghanistan but have also written that this will be for nothing if there is not a strategy that recognizes that, just as with Iraq, there is no purely military solution possible.

A new U.S. general in Afghanistan is reportedly poised to ask for more troops. The president and the American public need to be exceedingly skeptical. The maxim that military action has its limitations is truer for Afghanistan than it was for Iraq.

Lack of concrete national identity is a problem in Iraq. But fragmented, highly tribalized Afghanistan makes Iraq look like Sweden.

Iraq has held elections that achieved some modicum of legitimacy. Afghanistan's recent elections seem more fraud than election. And corruption seems to pervade every level of Afghanistan's government, even to the extent that murderous, poppy-growing warlords are part of the ruling elite.

The Obama administration has said that it realizes the importance of redevelopment, agricultural aid and education in weaning the country from al-Qaida and Taliban, which control nearly half the country and enjoy semi-safe haven in neighboring Pakistan.

This is the most prudent route.

Because so much time has been wasted — owing to war in Iraq — it is tempting to argue for patience in helping Afghanistan achieve a secure nationhood.

More troops in other words.

This is a hard sell. There is, for instance, no indication that building a nation from scratch is possible. There is no indication the government there is going to ever become a responsible partner.

The Afghan people can hardly be blamed for wondering if an ineffective and massively corrupt national government allied to the United States is preferable to the brutally pious but comparatively cleaner governance from the Taliban.

A military buildup, particularly in the south where the Taliban is strongest, is likely to produce backlash from Pashtun tribesmen wary of any foreign occupation.

This argues for military withdrawal instead of infusion, relying on diplomatic efforts and civilian economic and educational efforts.

It's true, the Taliban is not defeated. Al-Qaida still has too free a hand, up to and including Osama bin Laden still running loose. But U.S. military efforts are wasted without an effective Afghan partner and unless Pakistan becomes a willing participant in the fight. There will never be enough troops or enough firepower to win under these circumstances, particularly with far too many civilian casualties hardening hearts.

The solution to Afghanistan lies partially in achieving a stable Pakistan but is more achievable by giving the Afghan people a better choice than the brutality of the Taliban or the bombs and bullets of a continued allied military presence. More agricultural aid and infrastructure improvements are needed.

We await the case that Gen. Stanley McChrystal is expected to make for more troops to see if it includes an expanded strategy beyond military might.

At the moment, any strategy that requires additional U.S. troops has the too familiar whiff of quagmire.

REPRINTED FROM THE MILWAUKEE JOURNAL SENTINEL.

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